This paper outlines a theoretical framework to think about the role of NIT on earnings inequality at a domestic level. Two main ideas inspired a growth model. First, to be connected is only meaningful for people who are already literate. Second internet, like the invention of printing, permits to increase the part of knowledge that an individual can use. The results are obtained in terms of the Lorenz criterion. The role of some key parameters is emphasized like the elasticity of substitution between talent and knowledge.Two forces are at work. On the one hand, the gap between literate and non literate people will increase. On the other hand, the incentive to become literate increases. Policy implications are derived.
Introduction

1
The emergence of the knowledge society seems a main feature of developed economies at the start of the 21 st century. There is no question that new information technologies (NIT) represent a source of wealth for a society taken as a whole. The question of the impact of these technologies on distribution issues, either at a national level or at an international one remains open. Newspapers, for instance, are full of articles which express the fear of a digital divide between people who are connected and people who are not. The former at the opposite of the latter have access to knowledge which is a source of opportunities and wealth. In the same vein, the idea of an increase of the North-South gap is often mentioned. This paper questions the validity of this fear and investigates the main factors that can in ‡uence the evolution of inequality in a given society after the introduction of internet. We organize the discussion around a very simple model which …gures out the adoption of internet in a closed economy. The question is so broad that we have to focus on some issues and to ignore some very important ones intentionaly. Among income sources, capital incomes are omitted. Indeed all inequality decomposition studies agree on the de…nite importance of earnings inequality in industralized countries see for instance Jenkins [8] or Sastre and Trannoy [23] . Hence we restrict our attention to this income component. As a consequence our model is a growth model without capital. Another limitation of the analysis comes from the consideration of a closed economy. The interaction between international trade and IT adoption cannot be analysed in such a framework. Therefore the question precisely addressed in this paper is the impact of the IT revolution on earnings inequality at a domestic level.
Two main ideas govern the model. From a qualitative point of view, the digital revolution can be analysed in the same way as two former revolutions in the knowledge technology. The …rst one is the invention of writing, the second one the invention of printing. What are the main characteristics of the di¤usion of knowledge that writing brought to human societies? According to Goody [6] , "writing overcame the limitations of memory in oral societies by providing for quasi-permanent storage in material form, which permitted precise communication over time and over space. Writing renders knowledge public in that its publication makes it available to all who can read. Restrictions come on the di¤usion of knowledge before that particular moment. Afterwards it is open to a speed of circulation and to the accumulation and augmentation by others that change the nature of knowledge systems". Clearly, if we analyse the change operated by printing in occidental societies, it enormously extends the bene…ts brought by writing. The digital technology like printing has an impact on the two essential components of the costs borne by information providers, see Shapiro and Varian [25] for developments. It reduces both the reproduction and the distribution costs. This change is captured in the model by a parameter that …gures out the proportion of the knowledge stock of a given society that an individual can mobilize on its own. The value of this parameter increased once with the printing revolution and again with the digital one. A question raised here is whether internet will decrease the cost to be literate as printing surely did. Let us recall the importance of the …rst complete Bible in English published in 1535-1536 for the reading practice in Britain, a fact which is well documented (see Oxford [20] ). The evidence that internet will induce such a similar shock on education technology is not obvious for the moment, but it may be still to come (see Gates (1995) [5] ). In the reference model, we adopt a pessimistic view, and we assume that it will not produce any productivity gain in the education technology.
The second main idea is that the interest to be connected to internet depends on your literacy. If you are illiterate, the interest of a connection is small if any. Since it is costly …nancially -hardware, software and connection spell-to say nothing of cognitive costs, we can suspect that people with a poor literacy score will not choose to be connected. On the opposite, people with a medium or high literate level will …nd an advantage to be connected to get a better job or a better life. In view of the asymetry between literacy choice and connection choice, it is useful to modelize the decision as a sequential one, …rst to decide to be literate or not, then to be connected or not for those who have chosen to be literate. Then at a personal level, it seems that we can establish a link between literacy and connection decisions. We still have to …nd some empirical evidence of such a link at a more aggregated level. Let us …rst agree on the meaning of literacy.
According to the International Adult Literacy survey (IALS) (see OECD (2000) [17] , 2 ) literacy is de…ned as "the ability to understand and employ printed information in daily activities, at home, at work and in the community, -to achieve one's goals, and to develop one's knowledge and potential". This broad de…nition encompasses the multiplicity of skills that constitute literacy in advanced countries. This de…nition is make more precise for the sake of measurement and is fragmented into prose literacy, document literacy and quantitative literacy. The …rst one covers "the knowledge and skills needed to understand and use information from texts including editorials, new stories, brochures and instruction manuals". The second one embodies "the knowledge and skills required to locate and use information contained in various formats, including job applications, payroll forms, trans-portations schedules, maps, tables and charts, while the third deals with "the knowledge ans skills required to apply arithmetic operations, either alone or sequentially, to numbers embedded in printed materials, such as balancing a chequebook, …guring out a tip, completing an order form or determining the amount of interest on a loan from an advertisement". The IALS stresses that it no longer de…nes literacy in terms of an arbitrary standard of reading performance, distinguishing the few who completely fail the test (the "illiterates") from nearly all the remaining in industrialized countries who reach a minimum threshold "those who are "literate"). Indeed, it de…nes …ve levels of literacy from 1 to 5 according to scores achieved at some tests. Nevertheless it turns out that among the …ve levels of literacy, the …rst two, levels 1 and 2 are considered below a reference line 3 . It is this kind of reference line that we try to take into account here. In our model, we consider that there is a threshold between people who are literate and people who aren't.
In a cross-section analysis made among 20 industrialized countries, it is possible to check roughly the existence of a relation between connection rate and illiteracy rate. The scattered diagram illustrates the relation between the ratio of computers connected to internet (at work and at home) per 1000 inhabitants (source : United Nations [26] 4 ) and the arithmetic mean of the proportion of people who are below level 3 at prose literacy, document literacy and quantitative literacy tests 5 . Indeed we consider that to be connected mobilize the three types of literacy already mentioned to some degree.(See Data Values for the Table in Appendix) .
INSERT FIGURE 1 The …gure captures a potential log-lin relation. The empirical evidence gives some credit to this kind of relation and the results of the regression are displayed below. This result 6 does not in…rm the view that there is a signi…cant negative in ‡uence of the illiteracy rate on the growth rate of the proportion of people connected to internet. Since this latter variable is linked to an investment in information technology it is a reminiscence of a …nding of Romer [22] which shows that the initial level of literacy does help to predict the subsequent rate of investment.
A more technical remark is in order. Endogeneous growth theory (see for instance Aghion and Howitt [1] ) has focused on the crucial role played by the accumulation of technological 3 See Figure 2 .2 p 17 Chapter 2. In describing level 3, it is stated that "it is considering a suitable minimum for coping with the demands of everyday life and work in a complex, advanced society. It denotes roughly teh skill level required for successful secondary school completion and college entry". 4 Source: Table A1 .3 p53. 5 Source Table 2.2 Annex D OECD (2000) . 6 When one controls for the GDP per capita (PPA), one obtains silly results, the sign of the GDP variable is negative and the sign of illiteracy variable becomes positive. We think that the sample is too small to estimate the role of the two variables correctly. But it is interesting to notice that in a simple regression the …t is better with illiteracy than with GDP. Indeed the results of this second regression are: [3] and Sen [24] ) will be investigated. In view of the generality and robustness of the results it will be worth it to overcome the technical di¢culties generated by handling more complex instruments. I begin in Section 2 with a model of literacy decision in a world where printing already exists. Section 3 describes an extension of the model which analyses literacy and connection choices in a society where internet has been invented. Section 4 contains policy implications and some conclusive comments. Proofs are relegated in Appendix.
Literacy and Inequality
At each period t; t = 1; :::; !; a generation, called the generation t, composed of a continuum of agents, lives one unit of time. Individuals are supposed to be identical with respect to their physical ability, w 0 > 0. They are heterogeneous with respect to cognitive ability !: This variable is distributed according to a cumulative distribution F (:) which admits a density f (:) over a …nite support [!; !]; ! > 0. The set of such distritbutions is denoted F . Throughout the paper, this distribution is held constant.
The model outlines an artisan economy with no land and capital. The focus is on the role of knowledge in income distribution. Since we want to explain inequality of lifetime incomes, decisions of labour supply are not modelized. Nickell and Layard (1999) [16] 7 …nd that the best predictor at a macroeconomic level of earnings inequality in OECD countries is the inequality of scores obtained at quantitative literacy tests. It is such a …nding that the model tries to capture. At each generation, individuals have only one choice to make, to be literate or not. Of course education plays a great part to become literate but remaining literate demands an e¤ort during all your life. In that sense, an individual can con…rm or in…rm a choice made by his parents while a child.
In case of a negative answer, the lifetime income of an illiterate individual of type ! belonging to generation t denoted y t (!; 0); is equal to
He can only sell his brute physical strength on the labor market as for instance a road worker. In case of a positive answer, earnings are given by a C.E.S return function de…ned by two inputs, the cognitive ability and the stock of knowledge accumulated at the previous 7 pp 3077-3078. period, denoted K t¡1 . The lifetime income of a literate individual of type ! belonging to generation t, denoted y t (!; 1); is equal to
where µ t a parameter in (0; 1) represents the part of knowledge which an individual can resort to. This formulation tries to capture the key elements which in ‡uence the earnings of an intellectual job, let us say for instance, a writer. Her income is generated by the combination of two production factors, a private one, the innate talent, and a public one, the used knowledge of a generation, µ t K t¡1 . Among the literates, the natural ranking is preserved, but the public good e¤ect of knowledge mitigates the inborn di¤erence beween individuals. The portion of knowledge that an individual, µ t , can mobilize for her bene…t is dependent on the technology and can change from one generation to another. The elasticity of substitution between talent and knowledge ¾ =
1¡½
proves to be a crucial parameter in the study of inequality.
Before pursuing, let us establish a link between this expression and the human capital earnings function. It seems to be easier with the Cobb-Douglas formulation. Just for the exercice of comparison, one adopts a double indices notation: y it denotes the earnings of an individual i belonging to generation t. Assuming just for the exercice that µ is speci…c to an individual i, (ii) is more suitably written
Trying to estimate this expression, it seems clear that the last term of RHS is a residual, since ! i is not observable. The same remark may be made about µ i , but we can postulate that education and experience increase it. Let us assume that
where S represents years of completed education, E represents the working experience and is a statistical residual.. If we combine the two expressions above, we are back to Mincer's model (1974) [15] for which the log of individual earnings in a given time period can be decomposed into an additive function of a linear education term and a quadratic experience term
where e is a statistical residual and letting a = (1¡®) log K t¡1 . Knowledge plays the role of a constant within a generation. If we want to explain earnings di¤erentials generations, knowledge by itself must enter as an explanatory variable and the speci…cation to be estimated becomes
which allows to infer the value of ®: We can conclude that formulation (2) is compatible with standard human capital earnings function and can o¤er a plausible interpretation of the constant in Mincer's equation. Endogeneous growth theory puts knowledge in the forefront. The expression above suggests that it may be a good idea to do it as well for labor economics.
Going back to the model, utility is assumed to be quasi-linear in income and in case of a illiterate person, his lifetime utility is given by his income. A parameter c t enters in the lifetime utility of a literate individual and it …gures out the …nancial cost to be literate as well as a monetary appraisal of the cognitive e¤ort implied by such a learning. Since we do not want to cope with two parameters of individual heterogeneity, we assume that this learning cost does not vary across individuals. With obvious notations we de…ne
Innovations in information technologies, educative training or government intervention through for instance free compulsory public education or vouchers, can reduce the learning cost c. An individual decides to become literate i¤
Hence, at each generation, a threshold in terms of cognitive talent, ! ¤ t , is implicitly de…ned between those with a cognitive ability larger or equal who will choose to become literate and those with a strictly smaller cognitive value who …nd this e¤ort unvaluable. This threshold is de…ned by
Quite naturally, this threshold increases in learning cost and decreases in knowledge as well as in the proportion of knowledge absorbed by an individual. The income cumulative distribution of a generation which presents a point mass in ! 0 ; can be easily deduced
When a generation is fully literate, the income distribution is described by one of the last two equations.
To end the description of the model, we have to specify the law of accumulation of knowledge. We assume that only literate people can extend the knowledge of a society. Moreover we assume that knowlege cannot become obsolete. Knowledge grows at a constant rate¯2 (0; 1) in a fully literate society: Since the literacy rate of generation t is equal to 1 ¡ F (! ¤ t ); we write
The dynamics across generations of such an economy can be easily expressed if we assume that the initial stock of knowledge, K 0 ; accumulated by the oral tradition is strictly positive. Moreover we suppose that
The invention of writing by itself proves that in the history of mankind there was an individual who satis…ed this inequality 8 .
Proposition 2.1 Let c t and µ t be constant over time. Under the assumptions, there is a period t ¤ from which the society is fully literate, i-e, 8t < t
Proof. See Appendix A Hence in case of a stability of the parameters of the economy, each generation becomes more literate than its precursor until a generation becomes fully literate. From this generation, knowledge grows at a constant rate. Then two periods can be distinguished, a period of fully literate generations,a mature period, and an initial period where illiterate and literate people coexist, a transition period.
First, we begin with the analysis of the evolution of income inequality for the mature period. More speci…cally, it is instructive to learn the consequences of choosing a particular value for the elasticity of substitution between talent and knowledge on the shape of the evolution of income inequality.
Inequality is measured by an index of inequality consistent with the Lorenz criterion. The Lorenz ordering of distributions involves the comparison of the income shares accruing to di¤erent fractions of the population. Given a cumulative distribution function G de…ned on a support X = [!; !]; its mean is de…ned by its
xdG(x) and its left inverse distribution function is de…ned by
The Lorenz curve of a distribution G is given by
Actually, L G (p) represents the proportion of total income possessed by the px100% poorest income units in con…guration G. De…nition 2.1 Given F and G two distribution functions, we say that F weakly dominates G in the (relative) Lorenz sense, which we write
We denote as > L the asymetric component of¸L : Sometimes, it is more suitable to present the results in terms of inequality indices. De…nition 2.2 Let F be the set of distribution function on X. A relative inequality index is a real valued function I de…ned on F which is Lorenz consistent, i-e, I(F )¸I(G) () F L G and which is equal to zero in case of a point mass.
The set of relative inequality indices will be denoted I. Our second proposition gathers some results about the earnings inequality in fully literate societies. In this particular case, the income distribution G F is derived from the distribution of talents F through the following relation
When we make comparisons of inequality, we would like their domain of validity to be as extensive as possible, namely, that they do not depend on the talent distribution. Here we stick to this requirement, which is justi…ed by our ignorance of the true distribution of skills. But we have to recognize that this care about robustness has a cost. In some circumstances, it can be impossible to conclude to an increase (or a decrease) in inequality whatever the distribution of talents. From a formal point of view, this investigation relies on results obtained about the progressivity of taxation schemes, see Jakobsson [7] , Eichhorn Funke and Richter [4] , Le Breton Moyes and Trannoy [10] .
Proposition 2.2 Let t¸t
¤ . It is composed of …ve statements valid for all I 2 I and for all F 2 F.
(i) If K t¡1 = 0; the income inequality is null for all ½ · 0 and the income inequality is equal to the natural inequality, namely, I(G F ) = I(F ) for the case 0 < ½ · 1:
(ii) Whatever the values of K t¡1 and ½,
(iii) In the Cobb-Douglas case, inequality is invariant to the stock of knowledge, provided it is positive.
(iv) Let µ t = µ: Then,
Proof. See Appendix B Figure ( 2) illustrates the evolution of inequality according to the value of the elasticity of substitution which is the key parameter. If talent and knowledge are rather substitute, a fully literate society will converge toward a fully equal society. If talent and knowledge are rather complementary, the inequality of talents will become the dominant factor in the long run for a fully literate society. The Cobb-Douglas case provides a unique evolution, the steady state is reached immediately. A gain in knowledge increases the income of each literate person in the same proportion. In the following, we will refer to the inequality in a Cobb-Douglas economy as the Cobb-Douglas inequality.
Insert Figure 2 In view of these results, the plausibility of all scenarii does not appear to be the same. It seems clear that the case for the substitution is rather weak. Let us now examine the Cobb-Douglas and complementary cases. For obvious reasons the data available on earnings inequality on the long run, since for example the invention of printing, are scarce. A noticeable exception is Britain for which we have access to statistical elements from the late eighteenth century (Williamson [27] ). Lindert [12] 9 estimates on the basis of the more recent articles that "It is hard to say there was any rise-fall pattern in pay gaps within the non-farm sector across the nineteenth century". The beginning of the twentieth century corresponds surely to a con…guration where almost all Britons received a compulsory education. Piketty [21] …nds a similar empirical evidence of a more or less constant earnings inequality over the twentieth century for France. Hence there is no strong empirical evidence against the Cobb-Douglas case and for this reason it will occupy a proeminent place in the following. To simplify the notations, from now on G F (y t ; ½)´G F (y t ):
Now we study the evolution of income inequality in the transition period. On the one hand, we would like to compare inequality of income distribution within the generation t ¤ and within a generation t < t ¤ and on the other hand we would like to compare the inequality between two transition generations. The …rst question raised is about the comparison of a fully literate society and a partially literate society, while the second question addressed is : Does the extension of literacy bring inequality in uncomplete literate societies? As stated by the next proposition a conclusion independent of the distribution of talents is impossible to achieve. Proposition 2.3 Let c t and µ t be constant over time.(i) It is impossible to obtain a ranking of the Lorenz curves associated to the income distribution of generation t ¤ and to the income distribution of a generation t with t < t ¤ valid for all F 2 F. (ii)It is impossible to obtain a ranking of the Lorenz curves associated with the income distribution of generation t and to the income distribution of a generation t 0 with t < t 0 < t ¤ valid for all F 2 F.
Proof. See Appendix C The proof of the above proposition teaches us that the trouble comes from the discontinuity of the income function at ! ¤ t which jumps from ! 0 to ! 0 + c. Hence the discontinuity introduced by the literacy cost produces such an impossibility to rank income distributions from an inequality point of view 10 . Unfortunately the obtention of positive ones implies the restriction of the domain of talent distributions. The next proposition follows this route. Hence we can expect that a condition requiring the discontinuity to be not too large will help to obtain explicit comparisons. Indeed one of the conditions which emerges bounds the ratio c ! 0 : Here our aim is not to …nd necessary and su¢cient conditions to be able to rank earnings distributions. We will be pleased to …nd su¢cient conditions which allow to perform a comparison between the income distribution in a partially literate generation and in a fully literate generation.
Let us denote
Since ® is the elasticity of the return function to the talent, we term ! ® the "dollar-talent" and ¹ F (®) the "dollar-talent"average. The dollar-talent average up to ! is equal to
The dollar-talent ratio up to ! is de…ned as
This ratio is bounded by 1 and lim !!! T (!) = 1. Then if T (!) is monotone, it can only be monotone decreasing. Indeed, it is at least the case with a uniform continuous and a Pareto probability distribution.
Proposition 2.4 Let c t and µ t be constant over time. Let F 2 F be such that T (!) is decreasing. Then for any such F 2 F , there exists a period T (!) with 1 · t F < t ¤ such that for any t with t < t F ;
Moreover t F is decreasing with
Proof. See Appendix D Hence the lower the literacy cost is, the more complete the ranking of income distributions is. The most plausible dynamics is that starting from a complete equal income distribution, the invention of writing or printing introduces inequality, albeit many partially literate generations experiment a level of inequality strictly smaller than the level characterizing a fully literate society. It may be the case that inequality is higher in …nal transition periods than in the steady state. It is still possible that beyond t F not de…nite conclusion is obtained. Let us recall that these …ndings concern the Cobb-Douglas case.
The Connection Decision and Inequality
We provide an extension of the model 11 which captures the invention of internet. Individuals have the possibility to be connected to internet at a cost c 0 t . It …gures out the …nancial cost to be connected (personal computer, connection costs) augmented by cognitive costs associated to the learning period. Albeit individuals can choose to be connected whatever their literacy mastery is, we assume that the bene…ts to do so are substantial only if they are fully literate. In this version of the model we capture these bene…ts through a parameter µ 0 t with 1 > µ 0 t > µ t which represents the part of the knowledge that individuals can mobilize with internet. Therefore µ 0 t ¡ µ t represents the informational gain associated to internet. Hence the lifetime income of a connected literate individual of type ! belonging to generation t, denoted y t (!; 1; 1);is equal to
) 11 The Cobb-Douglas case is only treated.
Since a rational illiterate person has clearly no interest to connect, the choice of an individual is between three options; to be illiterate and unconnected, to be literate and unconnected and to be literate and connected. The utility associated to the …rst option is de…ned by
the utility of the second by
and the utility of the third by
An individual decides to become literate and connected i¤ U t (!; 1; 1)¸U t (!; 1; 0) and U t (!; 1; 1)¸U t (!; 0; 0):
The …rst inequality de…nes a threshold
as well as the second inequality
An individual becomes literate and connected i¤
while an individual chooses to become literate and unconnected i¤
Finally an individual remains illiterate i¤
Two regimes can be distinguished according to the respective values of this three thresholds. 
then, in any transition period, there only exists two kinds of individuals, the literate and connected ones for which !¸! ¤¤¤ t and the illiterate ones for which ! < ! ¤¤¤ t : (ii) Second Regime. Otherwise, in any transition period, there exists three groups of individuals, the literate and connected for which !¸! ¤¤ t ; the literate and unconnected ones for which !¸min[! Proof. See Appendix E. The condition stated in this proposition means that the connection bene…t is larger than the connection cost relatively to their respective values associated to literacy. If this condition holds, we are going back to the con…guration studied in the second section, except that the threshold value is di¤erent. If this condition does not stand, there are three groups, a regime re ‡ecting the present con…guration in many countries. We start by studying inequality evolution in the simplest case of a fully literate society.
The Advanced Country Case
The period at which internet appears is assumed to be posterior to t ¤ . W.l.o.g, we will suppose that internet is discovered in t ¤ . Therefore an individual is connected if
and unconnected otherwise. Even if no society can be considered as fully literate in the sense given in the introduction, this case proves to be instructive as a benchmark. We assume that all parameters are constant through time and that internet does not speed up the growth rate of knowledge. Admitting that it represents a pessimistic view, the law of accumulation of knowledge is still given by
Proposition 3.2 Let c t ; c 0 t and µ t ; µ 0 t be constant over time. Generations become more and more connected and there is a period t ¤¤ from which society is fully connected, i-e, 8t < t
Proof. See Appendix F. The evolution of inequality in this case is described in the next proposition. The …rst statement compares the dynamics of inequality with internet and without internet. A superscript equal to 1 refers to the situation "without", a superscript 2 to the situation "with". The evolution of the knowledge stock is the same in the two con…gurations. In the second one, we already know that inequality will remain constant beyond t ¤¤ . The second statement compares the inequality for two generations living in the period of transition between a fully literate society and a fully literate connected society. Proposition 3.3 (i) For all t ¤ < t < t ¤¤ and for all F 2 F
(ii) The Lorenz curves associated to G F (y t ) and to G F (y t 0 ) with t ¤ < t < t ¤¤ and t
Proof. See Appendix G. In a fully literate society, the introduction of internet generates inequality for the transition period but it is impossible to rank income distributions of the period of transition. Indeed both the poorest and the richest individuals experiment a decrease of their income shares with the di¤usion of internet.
Developing Country Case
We assume that the internet invention is anterior to t ¤ and occurs in period t I : We start by the analysis of the …rst regime.
Proposition 3.4 Let c t ; c 0 t and µ t ; µ 0 t be constant over time. Under assumption prevailing in …rst regime, there is a period t ¤¤¤ from which the society is fully literate and connected, i-e, 8t < t ¤¤¤ ; !
Proof. The proof of the …rst statement is similar to that of proposition 2.1. The second statement derives from the fact that !
The transition period is shorter with internet. It speeds up the convergence process to a fully literate society. Since with a Cobb-Douglas return function a fully literate is more unequal than any partial literate society, we can expect a greater inequality for the transition period. Indeed the next proposition shows that this intuition proves to be true provided the connecting cost is su¢ciently large. With the same notations than with the advanced country case we state the following result.
Proposition 3.5 Let c t ; c 0 t and µ t ; µ 0 t be constant over time and assume that the …rst regime holds. Let F 2 F satisfying the following condition
for any t such t I · t < t ¤¤¤ :
Then for any t with t I · t < t ¤¤¤ ;
Proof. See Appendix H. In this …rst scenario (see Figure 4) , the two costs boil down to a generalized literacy cost. If the ratio of the relative literacy cost -the literacy cost relative to the minimum wage -is larger than the ratio of illiteracy rates weighted by their respective thresholds, then the comparison is unambiguous. This condition means that the con…gurations have to be su¢ciently distinct in order to be able to rank the respective income distributions.
We now turn to the second regime. Proof. The …rst statement is a consequence of propositions 2.1 and 3.2. The second statement derives from the fact that
The inequality evolution in this second regime is more in tune with the common wisdom. Internet will generate more inequality at each transition period up to the …rst fully literate and connected generation. 
Proof. See Appendix I.
Policy implications
The teachings of the model are the following. They concern the Cobb-Douglas case, a case where the elasticity of substitution between talent and knowledge is equal to one. This case is attractive since in a fully literate society inequality remains constant over time as knowledge increases. We show that starting from a totally illiterate society, earnings inequality will increase gradually as the illiterate rate diminishes and at some point can itself exceed its stationary value.
In a fully literate society the internet revolution produces a temporary upsurge of the earnings inequality like any innovation technology. Inequality will follow an inverted-U curve, a Kuznets curve, as per capita income rises. But in the long run, inequality will return to its stationary path.
When we move to the case where internet is introduced in an incomplete literate society, a case which can surely describe the situation of developing countries, two con…gurations must be distinguished. In the …rst one the relative bene…t of internet, in this model a larger access to knowledge, is so high to its relative cost that every literate individual connects. In this case internet rises the interest in being literate and the illiteracy rate decreases at a faster speed than the one which will be observed without internet. Thanks to internet such a society will converge to the inequality stationary state, experimenting a shorter transition period. The most impressive rise of inequality during this period will largely be a by product of this reduction of the transition period. In this case the impact of internet is ambiguous. On the one hand in the short run inequality increases. On the other hand, internet speeds up the convergence process of developing countries toward a fully literate society.
A more pessimistic case has also been investigated where internet has only bad e¤ects on the inequality dynamics. This time the relative cost of internet is higher than its relative bene…t in comparison with literacy; by way of consequence only a fraction of the literate population decides to connect. For a long time -the transition period which lasts until everyone is literate and connected-inequality will rise comparatively to a reference situation without internet.
As we move into the information age, policy-makers are increasingly concerned about the role played by knowledge in enhancing productivity growth and innovation. In view of the results they should also be concerned by its role in shaping inequalities. A public policy can prevent the occurence of the worrying scenario. On the one hand, providing free training public programs to internet and organizing the competition on the market of providers to internet can decrease the generalized connection costs. On the other hand, supplying the ADSL network on the whole territory like in Sweden can improve the bene…ts brought by internet. Such a policy acknowledges the public good e¤ect played by knowledge which mitigates the e¤ect of talent if both factors are not too complementary in the return function. The less literate a society is, the less favorable the impact of internet will be on the inequality dynamics The e¢ciency of the education system to innoculate the basic knowledge and know-how proves to be more crucial than it has been at every prior period. In this respect the scores obtained for instance in France at the entrance of junior high school are rather worrying. Only 68% (respectively 64%)of pupils in average pass a prose literacy (resp. quantitative) literacy test (Le Monde [11] ). It is di¢cult to accept a vision in which 35% of the population will be left over the cognitive progress. Obviously, internet can provide an improvement of the educational methods, an aspect which is not modelized here but as Bill Gates admits (Gates (1995) [5] ), we are still on the sides of the road ahead to this respect. For sure educational sofware will increase earnings inequality through a rise of the gains associated with intellectual property before they maybe contribute to a reduction of the illiteracy rate.
The model built is certainly a prototype and can be supplemented in several directions. Apart from considering the potential impact of internet on educative technology, the direct impact of internet on the speed of accumulation of the knowledge stock can also be incor-porated in the model. An increase of this speed can be viewed as plausible. For instance, Lyman and Varian [14] estimate that the growth rate of the worldwide production of books of original content is about 2 percent 12 . It will be interesting to see whether this rate grows in the near future. More immediate extensions would be to investigate other cases than the Cobb-Douglas one and to try to make a calibration of the model. We have modelized the literacy and the connection decision as a deterministic discrete choice. Introducing uncertainty will smooth the earnings distributions and make them closer to those observed. All these directions are matters for further research but we think that the main message is already provided by the model. Two forces drive the earnings inequality with internet. On the one hand, the gap between literate and non literate people will increase. On the other hand, the incentive to become literate increases. The …rst one will surely be dominant for a preliminary period. It is a matter of hope that the second one will prevail in the future. The sequence h! ¤ t i is bounded below by !. Furthermore, since hK t¡1 i is strictly increasing and
< 0; h! ¤ t i is strictly decreasing. Therefore it converges. It remains to prove that this limit is ! which is reached within a …nite number of periods. Let us build the sequence h e ! t i whose general term is de…ned by
< 0. Moreover h e ! t i reaches ! in a …nite number of periods. Indeed let us de…ne e t = min ft 2 N + j !¸e ! t g. Denoting [x] the greatest integer in x, we …nd (ii) y t (!; 1) is increasing with !. Furthermore
Hence yt(!;1) ! is decreasing with ! over the support [!; !]. By applying Proposition 3.1 in Le Breton, Moyes and Trannoy [10] which is a generalization of the Jakobsson's theorem on progressivity [7] , the result follows.
(iii) In the Cobb-Douglas case, inspection of formula 2 reveals that knowlege intervenes in a multiplicative way on the individual income. Therefore the relative inequality holds constant.
(iv) The elasticity of income relatively to knowledge " y=K is increasing in talent if ½ < 0 and decreasing if 0 < ½ · 1 since
Therefore the ratio
increases with K t¡1 if ½ < 0; which leads to an increase of inequality according to the relative Lorenz criterion. The opposite holds for 0 < ½ · 1:
(v) It follows from the fact that
and that
C Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proof. (i)The earnings in generation t are given by:
The earnings in generation t ¤ are given by
Let us de…ne the function H(y t ¤ ) which transforms income of generation t ¤ into income of generation t
Precisely 
(ii)The earnings in generation t 0 are given by
Let us de…ne the function H 0 (y t 0 ) which transforms income of generation t 0 into income of generation t.
Precisely
According to Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 in Le Breton, Moyes and Trannoy [10] , the continuity of H 0 over [y t 0 (!); y t 0 (!)] is a necessary condition for obtaining a ranking of the Lorenz curves of G F (y t ) G F (y t 0 ) valid for all G F (y t 0 ); F 2 F.
D Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. To save notations G F (y t (!))´G t : We recall that the slope of a Lorenz curve of a distribution G which admits a density over the support [!; !] at p 2 [0; 1] is given by
where at end points the slope must be interpreted as the left or right slope, see Lambert [13] . The Lorenz curves of
while the right slope at that point is equal to
Fact. For any t, the income functions de…ned by expressions (56) and (57) are rank preserving, namely, they are weakly increasing in !. Then the proportion of the population which is poorer than or equal to an individual of type ! is always equal to F (!) for any t. Therefore the slope of the Lorenz curve of G F (y t (!)) evaluated at p = F (!) is equal to :
Step1. We prove that if 13 The slope at ! ¤ t is the right hand slope.
and
Indeed, using the fact
we obtain
while
Then
which gives the condition expressed in (72). Moreover
again the condition expressed in (72).
Step 2. We now prove that
Suppose for a contradiction that
Combined with (74) we obtain
which contradicts
Step 3. We now prove that
We already know that the slope of L Gt is constant and equal to
which induces
Therefore the increasingness of the above ratio in ! implies that ! 
F Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. The sequence h! ¤¤ t i is bounded below by !. Furthermore, since hK t¡1 i is strictly increasing and since ! ¤¤ t is decreasing in K t¡1 , h! ¤¤ t i is strictly decreasing. Therefore it converges. It remains to prove that this limit is ! which is reached within a …nite number of periods. We can write
De…ne
except in the case where the expression inside [ ] is already the integer investigated.
G Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. (i) First it is obvious that
since the incomes of the p poorest individuals who are literate and unconnected do not change by assumption, while the average income is larger in situation 2 than in situation 1: Now we prove that
Let p = F (! 0 ). It comes
Hence
with
Finally we obtain
(ii) The initial slope of the Lorenz curve decreases with t. Indeed
Since µ 0 µ > 1; this ratio is increasing in ! ¤¤ t , which is itself decreasing in t. The …nal slope of the Lorenz curve decreases with t. Indeed
Since µ µ 0 < 1; this ratio is increasing in ! ¤¤ t , which is itself decreasing in t.
H Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proof. Its structure is similar to the proof of proposition 2.4.
Step 1. We prove that if for some t 
We already know that
Equivalently
Integrating by parts the last term of the RHS and rearranging, we obtain
The conclusion regarding (124) follows. The same token is used to prove (125).
Step 2. Using the same argument as in step 2 in Proposition 2.4, we deduce that
We now prove that 
